

Paper Reference(s) WHI04/1D

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level

History

International Advanced

PAPER 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Friday 16 June 2023 – Afternoon

Extracts Booklet

**DO NOT RETURN THIS BOOKLET WITH THE
QUESTION PAPER.**

Extracts for use with Section A.

EXTRACT 1: From P Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War*, published in 1997.

In the conduct of foreign relations, Stalin was usually cautious and did not take risks. However, between April and June 1950, Stalin's policy towards Korea diverged from the normal pattern. Stalin was interested in using Korea to outmanoeuvre the USA. The US had not committed itself to support South Korea and US policy towards Syngman Rhee's regime was unclear.

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In January, Stalin had indicated that he might change his cautious policy and support a North Korean offensive. Kim Il Sung visited the USSR for most of April 1950. Now Stalin decided to support an advance into South Korea by the North Korean army. The signal to 'go' had been given, but with clear conditions.

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In May–June 1950, substantial Soviet aid was dispatched to North Korea. Existing Soviet military personnel were replaced with men possessing battle experience. The plans for an offensive were drawn up jointly by Russian and North Korean officials.

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Extract 1 continued.

Stalin's decision to support Kim Il Sung was motivated by fear and insecurity rather than confidence. Stalin feared that, unless the North Koreans moved first, an attack from South Korea into the North might produce a situation he could not control. A more important defensive motive for Stalin resulted from the tense relations between the Soviet Union and China. Stalin was determined to prevent reconciliation between the United States and China, and this made action in Korea desirable.

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EXTRACT 2: From S N Goncharov, J W Lewis, Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, published in 1993.

It was not pressure from Stalin alone that led to the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea. Neither did the decision result from Kim Il Sung's adventurism, nor from a Soviet-North Korean or a Chinese-North Korean conspiracy. In fact, the decision came in bits and pieces, and was never coordinated or even thoroughly reviewed by those involved. It was reckless war-making of the worst kind.

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Each of the three Communist leaders involved made decisions based on assumptions that were largely concealed from each other and on facts that were untrue. The decision-making process was also partially driven by Soviet and Chinese policies that really had nothing to do with Korean reunification. The leaders made no provision for joint decision-making and any decisions did not really include North Korea.

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Extract 2 continued.

In April 1950, Kim Il Sung presented his case for the invasion on the basis that a full-scale attack would succeed. Stalin gave the go-ahead on the basis of Soviet interests and on condition that Mao agreed. Mao could not deny his North Korean comrades the same opportunity for unifying their country that the Chinese had demanded for themselves in China. In May 1950, Stalin finally gave Kim the signal to proceed. Given the sloppy decision-making, misperceptions and muddled objectives, it is no wonder that the invasion was a disaster.

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